Medicine Shortages – Causes and Approaches to Improvements Clinical Needs/Risks Assessment

EAHP Academy Seminar

19 – 21 October 2018, Warsaw, Poland

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
Conflict of Interest

Nothing to disclose

Outline

- Medicine shortages prescription and administration
- Prospective risk assessment
- Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA)
- Prioritization (First risk- First needs)
- Implications to real healthcare settings and an initial analysis of the results

POE and CPOE Hospital




Rodriguez-Gonzalez CG, Martin-Barbero ML, Herranz-Alonso A, et al. Use of failure mode, effect and criticality analysis to improve safety in the medication administration process, J Eval Clin Pract. 2015 Aug;21(4):549-59.

Implications to Real Healthcare Settings Risks and Hazards




The Flow of Information



Proactive Risk Assessment

- 1) Reduce the likelihood of patient harm
- 2) Seek the best solution in times of medicine shortages







Why Risk Assessment?

- Proactively detect risks that could cause patient harm
- Describe and rate risks based on probability and severity
- Prioritise detected risks
- Propose actions to reduce risks
- Simulate processes using the proposed actions aiming at reducing risks

Risks Associated with Medicine Shortages

- Incorrect dosage of the substitute medicine prescribed
- Improper administration of the substitute medicine
- New drug-drug interactions not reviewed
- Onset effects not properly assessed no information on treatmenteffect delays
- Adverse effect profiles not reviewed

Prospective Risk Analysis

Common in:

- Chemotherapy
- Blood transfusions
- Drug prescription
- Compounding parenteral nutrition
- Drug distribution systems
- Continous drug infusions
- Dialysis
- Drug administration analysis

Uncommon in other areas. Particularly drug shortages

Van Tilburg CM, Leistikow IP, Rademaker CMA, Bierings MB, van Dijk ATH. Health care failure mode and effect analysis: a useful proactive risk analysis in a pediatric oncology ward. Quality & Safety in Health Care. 2006;15(1):58-63.

Castro Vida MÁ, Martínez de la Plata JE, Morales-Molina JA, et al. Identification and prioritisation of risks in a hospital pharmacy using healthcare failure mode and effect analysis Eur J Hosp Pharm 2017;0:1–6.

Rodríguez-Gonzalez CG, Martin-Barbero ML, Herranz-Alonso A, et al. Use of failure mode, effect and criticality analysis to improve safety in the medication administration process, J Eval Clin Pract. 2015 Aug;21(4):549-59.


Prospective Risk Assessment

- Critical evaluation of the processes involved for medicine substitution in shortages
- Causes of failure modes detected which may lead to adverse events coming from the prescription and administration of medicines
- Prioritise interventions that need to be implemented to provide adequate medicine substitution according to failure modes

Treatment Second. Risk Assessment First.

- The healthcare setting in question
- How healthcare services are organized and provided
- IT infrastructure
- Communication channels multidsiciplinary cooperation

Proactive Medicine Shortage Management via Risk



Risk Assessment-Clinical Needs Assessment

- Clinical need to manage risks
- Replacement / alternative risks
- Internal support and external communication

The Parenteral Drug Association (PDA) Technical Report 68



Medicine Shortage Prevention and Response Plan Risk-Triage Model

Categorise medicine

Risk Management
& Control
measures

Register


Risk Register of Medicine Shortages

Generic name	Potential shortage risk	Risk source	Affected internal area	Initial risk level	Risk indicators	Intended risk- control measures	Expected risk level after corrective measures	Responsible party	Status

 Identify the risk level for the patient based on the availablity of an alternative medicine and its therapeutic use

Risk	Therapeutic Use of Products	Availability of Alternatives	Likelihood of Shortage	
High Life supporting or life sustaining		No Alternatives Available	High likelihood of shortage	
Medium	Acute short term or chronic long term	Alternative Products Available: Similar Therapy	Moderate likelihood of shortage	
Low	Other indications	Exact Product Available but in Other Presentations	Low likelihood of shortage	

 Determine the likelihood of a medicine shortage for a particular medicine



 Establish the risk-priority level based on the projected impact to the patient and the likelihood of a medicine shortage

2. At each risk level consider the likelihood of a drug shortage3. Define priority		Likelihood of Shortage			
		High	Moderate	Low	
Therapeutic Use & Consequences if	Risk Level A	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 2	
Product not Available	Risk Level B	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 2	Risk Priority Level 3	
	Risk Level C	Risk Priority Level 2	Risk Priority Level 3	Risk Priority Level 3	

Basic Example

Therapeutic use of product Availability of alternatives High risk level Likelihood of occurence High risk level - Medically necessary - Life sustaining - No alternatives Moderate risk level - Life supporting - Low inventory reserves - Dual sourced

Plan and implement risk control measures

Assign Risk Priority Level

Develop Risk Control Strategy

Evaluate Effective Strategies

Risk Assessment and Management

- Practitioner input
- Watch list
- Early identification
- Assessments based on existence and availibility

Medicines Watch List

- Antibiotics, antifungals and antivirals
- Antidotes and treatments for poisonings
- Emergency and Critical Care
- Vaccines
- Specific Immunoglobulins
- Anticonvulsants
- Obstetrics

How do we Assess and Verify?








TGA, Management and Communication of Medicine Shortages in Australia – A New Protocol for Australian Product Sponsors, the Therapeutic Goods Administration and supply chain stakeholders, TGA, 2018.

Medicine Substitute



Proactive Risk Assessment Models

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

Operational Risk Management (ORM)

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)

Root Cause Analysis (RCA)

Is the HFMEA Merely an Academic Exercise?



Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

Process flow diagramming

Hazard scoring matrix

Potential vulnerabilities assessment

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

- HFMEA analyzes a process:
- Precisely
- In a stepwise matter
- Can encounter failure modes which do not qualify as high risk
- The HFMEA team can still give recommendations for these non-high risk failure modes

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

More complete evaluation of vulnerabilities

Streamlined approach

Proactive Analysis

Make process safer as a whole

Prevent adverse events

HFMEA as applied to Several Hospitals Accross Europe

• Is the HFMEA a valid proactive tool to evaluate a circumscribed healthcare process like prescription up to and including administration of reserve antibiotic in the hospital wards/inpatient setting with a high detection rate of potential adverse events?



HFMEA Steps

Step 1- Define the topic Step 2- Assemble the team Step 3- Describe the process as a diagram Step 4- Conduct the analysis Step 5- Identify actions and outcome measures

Step 1 Define the Topic





5-6 Primary Process Steps

Avoid problem statements

Show proactive way to minimise risks


NOT "Preventing inapropriate medicines substitution during a medicine shortage"

BUT "Providing adequate and optimal medicine substitution during a medicine shortage"


Step 2 - Assemble the Team




Step 3 - Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 3 Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 3 Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 4 Conduct a Hazard Analysis

- List failure modes, causes and effects
- Determine severity and probability
- Use hazard scoring matrix
- Use the Decision tree for analysis
- Propose actions
- Recalculate the scores

Severity and Probability

,						
Severity						
Catastrophic event		Major event				
Patient Outcome: Death or permanent loss of function (sensory, motor, physiologic, or intellectual)		Permanent lessening of bodily functioning (sensor, motor, physiologic, or intellectual), disfigurement, surgical intervention required, increased length of stay for 3 or more patients, increased level of care for 3 or more patients				
Moderate event		Minor event				
Increased length of stay or increased level of care for 1 or 2 patients		No injury, nor increased length of stay nor increased level of care				
Probability Probability Probability Probability						
Frequent	Likely to occur immediately or within a short period (may happen several times in one year)					
Occasional	Probably will occur (may happen several times in 1 to 2 years)					


Possible to occur (may happen sometime in 2 to 5 years)

Uncommon

HFMEA Scoring Matrix

	Severity					
		Catastrophic (4)	Major (3)	Moderate (2)	Minor (1)	
Probability	Frequent (4)	16	12	8	4	
	Occasional (3)	12	9	6	3	
	Uncommon (2)	8	6	4	2	
	Remote (1)	4	3	2	1	

HFMEA Decision Tree



DeRosier JM and Bagian JP, Proactive Risk Assessment Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis Process, A cognitive aid and guidebook for the HFMEA process, Centre fo Healthcare Engineering & Patient Safety University of Michigan, 2017.

Healthcare Settings

Д

- 8 Failure Modes
- 38 Failure
 Mode Causes

B

- 13 Failure Modes
- 33 Failure Mode Causes

- 10 Failure Modes
- 18 Failure
 Mode Causes

Example HFMEA Key Words

Subprocess

Communicate information on a substitute

Failure mode

Information not transferred well

Failure cause


Software interface does not support efficient transfer

Effect

HC professional not aware of options available

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site A

What to check and in what order



Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site A

New potential interactions not Efectiveness of orginal vs 4C(1) 4F(2) properly reviewed before an alternative treatment not reviewed alternative is introduced No access to information 4F(2)a Lack of time 4C(1)a on interactions Access only to obsolete Not considered a priority 4C(1)b 4F(2)b information No IT support-integrated Not everyday practice 4C(1)c 4F(2)c software checker

Proposed Actions-Research Site A

Provide

Online access and sufficient data on AB spectrum of activity

IT support at the ward/pharmacy

Purchase

software (Lexi-Comp) and receive software PIM-Check

Archive obsolete paper literature to be replaced by up-to-date online resources on AB spectrum of activity

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site B

What to check and in what order

4A 4B 4C 4D 4F 4F Product Patient's characterist Establish ics (SmPC) medical Necessity Appropriat proper Availability record. of of the same eness of communica alternative administrat substitute Assess of tion among criticalness medicines alternatives ion of the according HC of the based on proposed/i antibiotic in to professiona ntroduced medicine antibacteri shortage pharmacoe Is to prescribed al spectrum to/by a compared conomic introduce including including physician to the (PE) an allergies, the side alternative aspects alternative needs effects profile

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site B

Partially checking availability of alternative medicines 4C(2) Lacking time 4C(2)a No guidance on who to contact 4C(2)b Overestimation of medicine stock 4C(2)c Insufficient external sources 4C(2)d

Unable to pass the information related to alternative routes of administration

4D(2)

Lacking communication between health care professionals

4D(2)a

Lacking IT support

4D(2)b

Proposed Actions-Research Site B

Provide

IT support at ward/pharmacy

SOPs for gathering information/daily ward stock assessment

Internal/external protocols of communication

Purhcase


Software Lexi-Comp

Receive free software PIM-Check

Intensify multidsciplinary collaboration

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site C

What to check and in what order



Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site C

HC prof. not directly involved in Limited awareness of HC prof. of prescribing unaware of 4D(1) substitution 4D(2) substitution HC prof. passively informed Pharmacist lacking time to about shortage and available 4D(1)a 4D(2)a provide feedback alternatives via IT HC prof. passively informed Clinicians do not prescribe via about medicine shortage and 4D(1)b 4D(2)b available alternatives via IT No effective internal communication in hospital 4D(2)c pharmacy Prejudice based on assumed professional portfolio 4D(2)d

Proposed Actions-Research Site C

Provide

- IT support regarding administration patterns
- Full supervision of contracted staff
 by senior staff
- Efficient less time consuming communication
- IT which actively cross-check lab data

Prioritise

Define list of medicines for which validation is a necessity

Define group of fragile patients for supervision

Practical Implications of HFMEA

Identifying and prioritise risks in hospital pharmacies

Preventing chemotherapy errors


Preventing risk to patients and medical practitioners using radiology medical devices in hospitals

Testing surgical instrument sterilization in response to positive biological indicators

Evaluating selected risk processes of the emergency surgery department

Prioritization Depends on the Context

- High hazard scores for FM require quick measures
- Lower hazard scores (below 8)
 must be reasseed as HFMEA
 methodology provides a more
 precise analysis of the process



Key Messages

- Using the HFMEA only for one process is feasible
- Be aware of potential frustration among team members due to the effort required for the HFMEA
- Do not immediately eliminate low hazard score failure modes prior to discussion within the team
- When proposing actions to control or eliminate failure modes, be aware of the real constraints posed by healthcare settings and the feasibility of each proposed action
- Think of how your medicine substitution system works

